In several cases in South Carolina Courts (and virtually all other jurisdictions) have ruled that habitual drunkenness to be a ground for divorce must “exist at or near the time of the filing of the action for a divorce.” Lee v. Lee,
282 S.C. 76, 316 S.E. 2d 435 (S.C. App. 1984); Grubbs v. Grubbs, 272 S.C. 138, 249 S.E. 2D 747 (1978).
emphasis added.
In many cases, clients certainly indicate that the ground existed at the time of filing but a witness to the drunken behavior may be unable to testify that the behavior existed exactly at that point in time. Many times a client will bring a witness who has observed this conduct and its effect on the marriage but has observed it earlier or much earlier than I would like for corroboration of the Plaintiff's (my client's) Case. What if a witness who observed the very same conduct testifies that it was present a mere one month prior to the separation of the parties which your client, the
Plaintiff, contends is at or near the time of the filing of the action for a divorce? Why if the client did not leave at that point is this not condonation? (forgiveness)
It is axiomatic that Habitual drunkenness, alcoholism, etc by its very nature is a continuing pattern of disfunction. The ground of Adultery for instance, even if serial, has distinct starting and stopping points. The language of a fixed habit of getting drunk on a continual basis connotes the legislature's, Court's, and public awareness that this pattern, if it exists, will continue to do so.1 The Late Randall Chastain, Esq. noted in his treatise “Finally, it should be noted that the South Carolina Court's conclusion that the marital offense must continue until substantially the time of the filing for the divorce would seem to point to this jurisdiction's having accepted the idea that habitual drunkenness is a continuing offense (as opposed to a single occurrence offense, like adultery). This has consequences when one is considering possible defenses......”2
One of those defenses, of course, is condonation. Condonation in the law of divorce means forgiveness, express or implied, by one spouse for a breach of marital duty by the other. More specifically, it is the forgiveness of an
antecedent matrimonial offense on condition that it shall not be repeated, and that the offender shall thereafter treat the forgiving party with conjugal kindness. (McLaughlin v. McLaughlin 244 S.C. 265, 272, 136 S. E.2d
537, 540). (emphasis added)
The South Carolina Court in Wilson v. Wilson stated that Condonation is primarily a state of mind, the existence of which may appear either from the language used, from conduct, or both. 274 S.C. 236, 238, 262 S. E. 2d 732, 733. Even if condonation exists it is a conditional forgiveness as stated in McLaughlin, above ..The authorities appear to be in agreement that condonation is a conditional forgiveness or remission of the previous offense or misconduct of the offending spouse, the implied condition being that the guilty party shall in the future refrain from committing any matrimonial offense. (244 S.C. 265, 275; 136 S. E.2d 537, 542) (emphasis supplied). These
portions of the case law in general and McLaughin, supra, specifically, are used by Chastain to illustrate
that despite condonation, the original offense/ grounds can be easily revived by future bad conduct.
Assuming that it is established that the divorce grounds (the offense) existed at or near the time of separation, the defense of condonation is almost nonsensical when the offense by its very nature is a recurring one. Every day/instance is a new revival of the offense.
1It is reasonable to believe that drunkeness, given it recurring nature, existed at time of separation particularly if it was established that it existed a mere month prior to the separation.
2This and Much of the following shamelessly lifted from The Law of Domestic Relations in South Carolina Vol. 1 (1986) by Randall Chastain, Esq.
282 S.C. 76, 316 S.E. 2d 435 (S.C. App. 1984); Grubbs v. Grubbs, 272 S.C. 138, 249 S.E. 2D 747 (1978).
emphasis added.
In many cases, clients certainly indicate that the ground existed at the time of filing but a witness to the drunken behavior may be unable to testify that the behavior existed exactly at that point in time. Many times a client will bring a witness who has observed this conduct and its effect on the marriage but has observed it earlier or much earlier than I would like for corroboration of the Plaintiff's (my client's) Case. What if a witness who observed the very same conduct testifies that it was present a mere one month prior to the separation of the parties which your client, the
Plaintiff, contends is at or near the time of the filing of the action for a divorce? Why if the client did not leave at that point is this not condonation? (forgiveness)
It is axiomatic that Habitual drunkenness, alcoholism, etc by its very nature is a continuing pattern of disfunction. The ground of Adultery for instance, even if serial, has distinct starting and stopping points. The language of a fixed habit of getting drunk on a continual basis connotes the legislature's, Court's, and public awareness that this pattern, if it exists, will continue to do so.1 The Late Randall Chastain, Esq. noted in his treatise “Finally, it should be noted that the South Carolina Court's conclusion that the marital offense must continue until substantially the time of the filing for the divorce would seem to point to this jurisdiction's having accepted the idea that habitual drunkenness is a continuing offense (as opposed to a single occurrence offense, like adultery). This has consequences when one is considering possible defenses......”2
One of those defenses, of course, is condonation. Condonation in the law of divorce means forgiveness, express or implied, by one spouse for a breach of marital duty by the other. More specifically, it is the forgiveness of an
antecedent matrimonial offense on condition that it shall not be repeated, and that the offender shall thereafter treat the forgiving party with conjugal kindness. (McLaughlin v. McLaughlin 244 S.C. 265, 272, 136 S. E.2d
537, 540). (emphasis added)
The South Carolina Court in Wilson v. Wilson stated that Condonation is primarily a state of mind, the existence of which may appear either from the language used, from conduct, or both. 274 S.C. 236, 238, 262 S. E. 2d 732, 733. Even if condonation exists it is a conditional forgiveness as stated in McLaughlin, above ..The authorities appear to be in agreement that condonation is a conditional forgiveness or remission of the previous offense or misconduct of the offending spouse, the implied condition being that the guilty party shall in the future refrain from committing any matrimonial offense. (244 S.C. 265, 275; 136 S. E.2d 537, 542) (emphasis supplied). These
portions of the case law in general and McLaughin, supra, specifically, are used by Chastain to illustrate
that despite condonation, the original offense/ grounds can be easily revived by future bad conduct.
Assuming that it is established that the divorce grounds (the offense) existed at or near the time of separation, the defense of condonation is almost nonsensical when the offense by its very nature is a recurring one. Every day/instance is a new revival of the offense.
1It is reasonable to believe that drunkeness, given it recurring nature, existed at time of separation particularly if it was established that it existed a mere month prior to the separation.
2This and Much of the following shamelessly lifted from The Law of Domestic Relations in South Carolina Vol. 1 (1986) by Randall Chastain, Esq.