Tue, 14 May 2024 00:03:04 -0700WeeblyMon, 20 May 2013 21:54:18 GMThttp://paulheldsumtersc.com/blog/habitual-drunkenness-condonationIn several cases  in South Carolina Courts (and virtually all other jurisdictions) have ruled that  habitual drunkenness to be a ground for divorce must “exist at  or near    the time of the filing of the action for a divorce.”   Lee v. Lee, 
282 S.C. 76, 316 S.E. 2d 435 (S.C. App.  1984); Grubbs v. Grubbs,  272 S.C. 138, 249 S.E. 2D 747 (1978). 
emphasis added.

  In many cases, clients  certainly indicate that the ground existed at the  time of filing but a witness to the drunken behavior may be unable to testify that the behavior existed exactly at that point in time. Many times a client will bring a witness who has observed this conduct and its effect on the marriage but has observed it earlier or much earlier than I would like for corroboration of the Plaintiff's (my client's) Case. What if a witness who observed the very same conduct testifies that   it was present a mere one month prior to the separation of the parties which your  client, the  
Plaintiff, contends is at or near the  time of the filing of the action  for a divorce?  Why if the client did not leave at that point is this not condonation?  (forgiveness)


  It is axiomatic that Habitual drunkenness,  alcoholism,  etc by its very nature is  a continuing pattern of disfunction. The ground of   Adultery for instance, even if serial, has distinct starting and stopping  points. The language of a fixed habit of getting drunk on a continual basis   connotes the legislature's, Court's, and public awareness that this pattern, if   it exists,  will continue to do so.1 The Late Randall Chastain, Esq.  noted in his treatise   “Finally, it should be noted that   the South Carolina Court's conclusion that    the   marital   offense must continue until substantially the time of the filing for the divorce  would seem to point to this jurisdiction's having accepted the idea that   habitual drunkenness is a continuing offense (as opposed to a single occurrence offense, like adultery). This has  consequences when one is considering possible defenses......”2


  One of those defenses, of course, is  condonation. Condonation in the law of   divorce means forgiveness, express or implied, by one spouse for a breach of  marital duty by the other. More specifically, it is the forgiveness of an 
antecedent matrimonial offense on condition that  it shall not be  repeated, and that the offender shall  thereafter treat the forgiving party with conjugal kindness.  (McLaughlin v.  McLaughlin 244 S.C. 265, 272, 136 S. E.2d 
537, 540). (emphasis   added)  
The South Carolina Court in  Wilson v.  Wilson   stated that Condonation is    primarily a state of mind, the existence of which may appear either from the  language used, from conduct, or both.  274 S.C. 236, 238, 262 S. E. 2d 732, 733. Even if  condonation exists it is a conditional forgiveness as stated in McLaughlin,  above ..The authorities appear to be in agreement that condonation is a conditional forgiveness or remission of the previous offense or misconduct of the offending spouse, the implied condition being that the guilty party shall in the future refrain from committing any matrimonial offense. (244 S.C. 265, 275; 136 S. E.2d 537, 542) (emphasis supplied). These
 portions  of    the case law in general and    McLaughin, supra, specifically, are used by Chastain to illustrate 
that despite condonation, the original offense/ grounds can be easily  revived by future bad   conduct.  
  
Assuming that it is  established that the divorce grounds (the offense) existed at or near the time  of separation, the defense of condonation is almost nonsensical when the  offense by its   very nature is a recurring one. Every day/instance is a new revival of the offense.  



1It is reasonable to  believe that drunkeness,  given it recurring nature, existed at time of separation particularly if it was   established that it existed a mere month prior to the   separation. 



2This and Much of the following  shamelessly lifted from The   Law of Domestic Relations in South Carolina Vol. 1 (1986) by Randall Chastain, Esq.
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